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Reforming the Global Economic Architecture:
Lessons from Recent Crises
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ*
RECENT TURMOIL IN INTERNATIONAL financial markets has raised a set of fun-
damental questions for the global community: Is the set of international
financial arrangements, established after the Great Depression and World
War II and modified after the abandonment of the gold standard in 1973, up
to the challenges of the twenty-first century? Are minor modifications ~such
as slight changes in the governance of the international financial institu-
tions, increased transparency, or surveillance! all that is required to adapt
these institutions to the needs of modern economies, or are more fundamen-
tal changes necessary? Today, although much has been proposed, discussed,
and argued, no consensus on desirable changes has yet been reached. In the
meantime, what can countries, especially the poor, the small, and the less-
developed, do to protect themselves from the seeming ravages of storms brought
on by international financial instability?
The subject is complicated, and in the time allotted to me, I cannot do it
justice. Rather than endeavoring to provide a comprehensive treatment, I
shall summarize my views in 10 basic points, followed by three important
methodological observations.
We should keep in mind that the success of a development or stabiliza-
tion program must be assessed by its impact on the livelihood of the con-
cerned individuals, not by whether the exchange rate has stabilized! Our
objective should be clear: the welfare of the citizens in the affected country,
with due attention to distributional concerns. A program cannot be hailed
a success if the exchange rate is stabilized, but the country falls into a
deep and prolonged recession. One cannot count a program a success until
unemployment has returned to normal levels and growth has resumed.
Ascertaining success is made ever more problematic by hypothesizing on
the counterfactual—that is, what would have happened in the absence of
the program? Perhaps output would have fallen even more, and unemploy-
ment risen even more. But since the advent of modern macromanagement,
governments in developed countries have been able to shorten downturns
and to mitigate their severity by taking strong countercyclical measures.1
Those advocating contractionary policies, for instance, in the event of a
crisis that in any case would have dampened the economy’s strength, bear
a heavy burden of proof: They must either show that more expansionary
*Chief Economist, The World Bank.
1 See, for example, Stiglitz ~1997a, 1997b!.
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policies were not feasible or that the contractionary policies generated stron-
ger long-term growth. Evidence on growth trajectories in general provides
little evidence in favor of the latter hypothesis.
With these caveats in mind, let me turn to 10 key policy points.
1. The international financial architecture has exhibited enormous
fragility over the past quarter century. Financial and currency crises
have hit with increasing frequency, at high budgetary costs to the govern-
ments that inevitably try to resurrect their economies. But the cost is high;
for years after the crisis, growth is slower and unemployment higher.2 By
one reckoning, 80 to 100 countries have faced a crisis since the mid-1970s.3
What inferences can we make from this experience? To introduce one of the
two metaphors that I will use frequently in the subsequent discussion: If there
is a single accident on a road, one is likely to look for a cause in the driver, his
car, or the weather. But if there are hundreds of accidents at the same bend of
the road, then questions need to be raised concerning the construction of the
road itself. Roads need to be designed not for perfect drivers, nor for drivers
trained to drive on race tracks, but for ordinary mortals. If average drivers re-
peatedly find the curves too difficult to navigate, it is time either to reengineer
the design of the road or to impose regulations on the cars that drive on it.
2. Capital and financial market liberalization are systemically re-
lated to this vulnerability. Both theory and empirical studies confirm this
conclusion. Premature financial market liberalization—for instance, before
the appropriate regulatory structures are in place—frequently leads to ex-
cessively risky lending by banks. Empirical studies show that the probabil-
ity of a financial crisis is particularly high in the five years following financial
market liberalization.4 The recent crisis in Asia followed this familiar pat-
tern. Given the Asian countries’ commitment to continue with financial mar-
ket liberalization, there was no obvious way in which to manage the
macroeconomic consequences of the surge of financial capital, which left
even more suddenly than it entered.5
Advances in economic theory ~e.g., Hellman, Murdock, and Stiglitz ~1996!!
show that reliance on capital adequacy standards, a common feature in coun-
tries that have engaged in financial market liberalization, is not Pareto effi-
2 For the growth result, see Caprio ~1997!. Economic downturns leave a long-term adverse
legacy, among other ways, through the attrition of human capital, which has been emphasized
in the literature on the hysteresis effect and may be a factor in the sustained high levels of
unemployment in Europe. See Blanchard and Summers ~1986!.
3 Caprio and Klingebiel ~1996! identify banking crises in 69 countries since the late 1970s,
which only includes countries with sufficient data. They estimate that the inclusion of transi-
tion economies would add crises in at least 20 more countries.
4 Kaminsky, Linzondo, and Reinhart ~1998!. See also the path-breaking study of Chile’s 1982
crisis by Diaz-Alejandro ~1985!. In the context of the Scandinavian crises see Steigum ~1992!
and Kiander and Vartia ~1996!.
5 For a more detailed discussion of the crises, see Furman and Stiglitz ~1999!.
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cient. It is particularly problematic to rely on capital adequacy standards in
economies with poor information systems and facing high risks. ~Because of
their smaller size, most LDCs are less diversified than larger economies and
thus face greater risks.! The problems of regulation in the aftermath of liber-
alization are exacerbated by the drain on trained personnel, as the booming
private financial sector is able to outbid the public sector. And the instabilities
arising from excessive reliance on collateral lending, an important feature of
the Asian economies, have long been known: Such lending practices reinforce a
boom, but when collateral values collapse, defaults soar and credit is con-
strained, furthering the decline in asset prices. These natural instabilities are
only reinforced by excessive reliance on capital adequacy standards, without
the sophisticated reliance on forbearance-cum-tightened regulatory super-
vision associated with more advanced economies. The beginning of the down-
turn leads to a few bankruptcies, putting banks below the required capital
adequacy standards. In a pessimistic environment, banks find it impossible to
raise additional funds, thus forcing them to cut back on lending. But as they all
do this, bankruptcies and the nonperforming loans soar, creating a vicious cycle.
Interestingly, many of the problems might not have arisen in the previous
regulatory regimes. Thailand, for instance, before it felt pressure to liberal-
ize, had imposed limitations on bank lending to speculative real estate. It
had been aware that such lending is a major source of instability and, more-
over, it was still under the impression that investing in employment—
creating factories—provided better foundations for a growth strategy than
building empty office buildings. But under pressure from those who pushed
on it the doctrines of the liberalized market, it succumbed to the judgment
of the market with disastrous consequences.6
There is a certain irony in this evidence of increased instability: One of
the arguments for capital market liberalization is that it leads to increased
diversification, which in turn makes the country less vulnerable. In fact,
what diversification occurred was mainly within East Asia and, as it turned
out, the shocks were highly correlated ~with the correlation perhaps exacer-
bated by the policies undertaken!. In any case, the increased vulnerability
posed by liberalization far outweighed the benefits of diversification, a re-
sult also observed elsewhere in the world.
3. Although capital market liberalization clearly portends greater
risks, it has not brought commensurate benefits in terms of economic
growth. Again, both theory and evidence support this conclusion. Rodrik
6 Another metaphor has become fashionable for small, less developed countries embarking
on financial and capital market liberalization. It is likened to a small boat setting sail on a wild
and rough ocean—even if well steered and solidly constructed, it is vulnerable to being hit
broadside by a wave and capsizing. And if the captain has not had proper training and if holes
have not been fully repaired ~if capital market liberalization proceeds too fast after financial
market regulation!, then a speedy and disastrous outcome is even more likely. Indeed, a design
to make the boat faster and sleeker at the same time makes it less stable. In Asia, there simply
was no time to take advantage of the allegedly improved design before disaster struck.
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~1998! shows that neither investment nor growth was associated with cap-
ital market liberalization using the same kind of cross country regressions
that typically show significant gains from trade liberalization. And of all the
regions in the world, East Asia was the least likely to gain from capital
account liberalization; with its high savings rate, it was hardly in need of
further capital infusions at the margin. The low returns that might be as-
sociated with these marginal investments made the expected returns low,
and left the risks high.
There are a number of reasons more generally why the view that capital
account liberalization gives rise to enhanced growth should be regarded with
skepticism. Liberalization has, in general, focused on opening a country to
short-term speculative f lows; but precisely because of the volatility of such
f lows, it is hard to base productive long-term investments on these funds.
In assessing the various sources of vulnerability, one factor has received
increasing attention: the ratio of short-term foreign debt to reserves. A large
fraction of countries in which that variable exceeded unity experienced cri-
ses. This variable did not appear in earlier studies of crises because econo-
mists had pointed out that any domestic asset could be converted into foreign
currency under a regime of complete convertibility, so existing short-term
foreign liabilities did not really represent the magnitude of the potential
“threat.”7 That the variable has recently attained prominence illustrates the
potential negative effects of short-term borrowing. Consider a poor, small
country in which a firm decides to borrow $100 million from an American
bank at 18 percent interest. Prudent behavior on the part of the country
then implies that it must increase its reserves by $100 million—likely held
in the form of U.S. Treasury bills. In effect, the country is then borrowing
from the United States at 18 percent and lending at 4 percent—hardly a
strategy that is likely to engender domestic growth, though it may resound-
ingly benefit the United States, among the most ardent advocates of capital
account liberalization.
The most important reason that capital and financial market liberaliza-
tion may not be related to growth is that it enhances instability; instability,
as we noted in lesson one, has significant adverse effects on growth.8
4. The adverse effects of financial and capital market liberaliza-
tion can, in turn, be related to the fact that there are marked dis-
crepancies between social and private returns and risks. East Asia’s
7 On the other hand, the result is consistent with multiple equilibria sunspot models: If
everyone believes that a ratio is believed by everyone else to be associated with a crisis, then
when they see the variable pass the threshold, they withdraw their funds, leading to a crisis.
For early models of multiple equilibria ~including sunspot equilibria!, see Stiglitz ~1972a! and
Shell ~1977!.
8 There are a variety of reasons for this: A pattern of instability implies greater riskiness for
investment, discouraging one of the main sources of growth. In economic downturns, invest-
ments in R&D and other productivity enhancing expenditures, as important as they are for
long-term growth, tend to be curtailed. See Greenwald and Stiglitz ~1989!.
Panel on Global Financial Markets and Public Policy 1511
crisis was related to private sector borrowing. Even Thailand’s large borrow-
ings should not have been a problem because the borrowing was being
used to finance private investment, which presumably yielded a return in
excess of the cost of borrowing. Only if one believed that there was a
government subsidy ~either explicit, or implicit, in the form of a presumed
bailout! should one have been worried—that is, if one believed in the effi-
ciency of market allocations. But the experience of East Asia has confirmed
lessons from experiences elsewhere: There are large systemic risks im-
posed on the economy by financial sector weaknesses and the surges in
capital f lows associated with capital account liberalization. The costs of
these disruptions are felt not only by the borrowers and lenders who engage
in the transactions, but also by workers, small businessmen, and others
throughout the economy.
5. It is intellectually incoherent to argue for bailouts and high-
light the importance of contagion and systemic risk but not to try
to address the underlying source of the problem. The previous point
argued that there are externalities associated with private, international,
short-term borrowing. If there were no such externalities, then it would
be hard to defend bailouts, and there would be no worry about contagion.
Just as we now recognize that the production of steel may give rise to an
important externality—air pollution—and that the externality necessitates
an important public role in trying to “force” ~through price or other forms
of regulation! less pollution, it is imperative to recognize the externalities
associated with these short-term private capital f lows. The consequence of
internalizing this externality in the former case may well be less steel
producing—essentially a redeployment of resources to better ref lect the
social costs and benefits of the activity rather than relying on the dis-
torted market allocations in which important social costs are ignored.
This, too, should be the case for the latter example. The widespread worry
that interventions might reduce the f low of capital is as misguided as the
worry that discouraging air pollution might discourage the production of
steel.
6. The thrust of the interventions should be to stabilize capital flows,
for it is the instability of such flows which generates the high costs
and which limits their benefits. Again, let me analogize with a metaphor:
Without a dam, the melting of the snows at the top of a mountain may give
rise to disastrous f loods, resulting in death and destruction. A well-designed
dam will temper the f low of water, but it will not stop the movement of
water from the mountaintop to the seaside. However, by stabilizing the f low,
the dam serves to reduce and perhaps eliminate the deathly and destructive
aspects of the torrent—indeed, the dam may convert the water into a power-
ful, productive force.
This has an important implication: A good dam does not have to stop all
f lows, even temporarily, to be of considerable value.
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7. Frequently, the key to stabilization is a comprehensive program.
Elsewhere, I have outlined a three-pronged program.9
1. Eliminating the government distortions that have encouraged short-
term flows. ~Thailand had a facility that had the effect of directly fa-
cilitating those f lows; Korea’s restrictions on long-term flows indirectly
encouraged short-term flows.!
2. Strengthening financial institutions. This in turn has a number of in-
gredients such as improved transparency; broad and effective bank reg-
ulation, including good, risk-adjusted capital adequacy standards ~f lexible
and adapted to particular circumstances of each country!; speed bumps,
such as limiting the rate of increase of lending; and exposure limits,
both direct and indirect ~on the firms to which the banks lend!
3. Direct interventions to stabilize the flows of capital not mediated through
the banking system.
It is important to recognize that the first two sets of measures, as im-
portant as they are, are both diff icult—especially for less-developed
countries—and are far from sufficient to inoculate countries against the
kinds of instabilities that have been so prevalent in the last quarter of a
century. Transparency in the form of mark-to-market accounting ~requiring
banks to record all assets at their current market value!, for instance, is
resisted today in the United States, even in the aftermath of the S&L
crisis ~which was in part attributed to poor regulation, including inade-
quately transparent information systems!. There was no reform, even after
it was recognized that failing to use marking to market practices not only
reduced transparency but led to distorted investment policies that poten-
tially and significantly increased the risk exposure of banks.10 Even under
the best of circumstances, obtaining the relevant data may be difficult—
and is becoming increasingly so.
Note that in standard competitive theory ~as articulated for instance
by Arrow and Debreu ~1954!!, the basis of the belief in the efficacy of
market processes assumes that all the relevant information is conveyed
by prices. The kinds of quantitative information being called for would,
under standard competitive assumptions, simply be irrelevant—no one is
calling for steel firms to release their sales figures. This highlights the
difference between markets for commodities such as steel and finance
markets, and it undermines the oft-heard argument that free mobility of
capital is just as welfare enhancing as free trade in goods. Financial mar-
kets are different. Similarly, even countries with advanced institutional
structures cannot claim an impressive record in managing their banking
systems—witness the recent financial crises in the United States, Scan-
9 See Stiglitz ~1998a, 1998b!.
10 Similarly, the well-known—and successful—opposition of U.S. government officials to FASB’s
proposals for more transparent accounting frameworks for stock options well illustrates the
political problems that such proposals frequently encounter. See Stiglitz ~1992!.
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dinavia, and Japan. No country has adequate risk adjustments for capital ad-
equacy standards or deposit insurance premia. Similarly, the fact that the last
major set of financial crises occurred in Scandinavia, countries noted for their
transparency, suggests that transparency by itself is not sufficient.
The increased use of derivatives—the risk implications of which are often
very difficult to assess—and their increasing complexity have further com-
plicated attempts at transparency and improved regulation.11
Let me be clear: Improved regulation and increased transparency are clearly
desirable. But we should not underestimate the difficulties or overestimate
the effectiveness of these measures. Those who think that regulation and
transparency are all that are needed are looking for cheap and easy solu-
tions to a complex and serious international problem. Or, alternatively, they
seek solutions that are ideologically compatible with the belief in “free
markets”—in spite of the evidence of the importance of market failures de-
scribed above ~see point one!.
That a comprehensive program needs to go beyond bank regulation is ev-
idenced by the experience of Indonesia, where two-thirds of the domestic
borrowing was undertaken by corporates. To return to the dam metaphor,
stopping bank borrowing from abroad may be like putting your finger in a
dike—it may plug up one hole, but the water will find a way around. If there
are economic incentives ~or misguided perceptions! that lead to a desire to
borrow abroad, corporates that can will do so, even if banks cannot do so on
their behalf.12
8. Although a comprehensive program is essential, its features need
to be adapted to the situation in each country. In particular, the regu-
latory framework for LDCs may well differ markedly from those of more-
developed countries because the risks are greater, the regulatory capacities
are weaker, and information is poorer. Developed countries have been mov-
ing to monitoring banks’ risk management systems, but direct controls should
continue to play a more prominent role in LDCs. Thus LDCs may need to
impose more stringent regulations on lending—for instance on speculative
real estate. They may need to impose speed limits ~restrictions on the rate at
which loan portfolios can grow!. They may need to limit the use of derivatives.
11 In several instances, firms believed that they had a covered position, only to discover that
the party providing the cover had gone bankrupt. Thus, bank regulators need not only to look
at “exposure” but at the portfolio position of those providing cover, and the correlation between
credit and market risks. The difficulties of doing so—and the disadvantaged position of regulators—
should be apparent. The recent failure of bank regulators in the United States to prevent a lone
hedge fund from borrowing sufficient amounts that its open positions posed systemic risk to the
global financial system should make us less than sanguine about a strategy focusing on LDCs
improving their transparency or regulatory capacities enough to prevent future crises.
12 At the same time, strong bank regulation—including restrictions on exposure of firms to
which the banks lend—can have a major impact on aggregate exposure. So too could appropri-
ate risk adjustments for capital adequacy standards and deposit insurance, which presumably
would induce banks to charge higher interest rates to firms that had high exposure. Current
risk adjustments fall markedly short of the mark.
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Modern bank regulation recognizes the inefficiencies—and even the
dangers—of excessive reliance on capital adequacy standards, and the prob-
lems in doing so are particularly acute for LDCs. Matters become even
worse if excessively stringent capital adequacy standards are imposed ~too
rapidly! in an economy in recession, where many banks will naturally fail
to meet those standards. The systemic credit contraction to which that can
give rise may be self-defeating for as banks contract credit to meet the
capital adequacy standards ~because in the midst of a recession, they are
likely to find it difficult to raise new capital!, more firms go bankrupt,
only increasing the fraction of loans that are nonperforming. In a dramatic
example of the fallacy of composition, a policy designed to ensure strong
banks—when an isolated bank has problems—actually undermines the
strength of the banking system when there are systemic weaknesses. Coun-
tries that have successfully managed financial crises and the accompany-
ing recessions have engaged in “forbearance”—temporarily weakening ~in
effect! capital adequacy standards, while they have increased the intensity
of supervision of transactions.
9. A key part of the reforms to stabilize the international financial
system is a fundamental reform of bankruptcy, including what I call
a “super chapter 11.” The reform of bankruptcy law needs to recognize the
difference between systemic bankruptcy, when a substantial fraction of the
firms in an economy are bankrupt, and an individual bankruptcy, when an
isolated firm cannot meet its obligations. The inferences that can be drawn
concerning managerial competency are dramatically different in the two
situations—few firms in any country could survive depreciations of currency
and increases in interest rates of the magnitude that occurred in East Asia.
The presumption should be that existing management continue in place; the
burden of proof should be on creditors to establish that there was a persis-
tent mismanagement of the firm’s assets. This is much like chapter 11, in
which management typically continues, with a simple rearrangement of claims
~with creditors typically taking some equity shares, though the original eq-
uity owners are seldom fully wiped out!. In a “super chapter 11” there would
be an even greater burden of proof on creditors if they seek alternative ar-
rangements, and perhaps even greater clarity in the specification of default
options.
It is not only that the information conveyed by the two types of bank-
ruptcy differs. The costs of the standard bankruptcy procedures can also be
enormous when applied to systemic bankruptcy. When there is systemic bank-
ruptcy, the frequent delays common in standard bankruptcy proceedings would
impose huge social costs. A super chapter 11 should be structured so that
corporate reorganizations could occur much faster and at much lower costs
than even a standard chapter 11.
The bankruptcy would be a ~decentralized, private sector! analogue to a
standstill. And the bankruptcy law would act as a circuit breaker in the
downward spiral that has characterized East Asia. Now, as the exchange
Panel on Global Financial Markets and Public Policy 1515
rate falls, more firms become nonperforming in the loans, weakening the
banking system, leading to a credit contraction, which reinforces the down-
ward dynamics. With the bankruptcy standstill, the losses of domestic play-
ers are limited. ~To be sure, a super chapter 11 might lead to higher interest
rates—so that the cost of borrowing may more accurately ref lect some of the
true social costs. See point 4 above.!
But just as bank regulation needs to be adapted to the situation in each
country, so too does bankruptcy law. Indeed, there is no single “Pareto dom-
inating” bankruptcy law. There are trade-offs between the interests of lend-
ers and borrowers, and even between domestic lenders and foreign lenders.
I have said nothing so far about grander changes, such as proposals for
creating a “lender of last resort.” Though this is not the place for a compre-
hensive treatment of what is, after all, a highly complicated subject, the
following points do seem worth making:
• Having a lender of last resort is not sufficient to protect an economy. The
Federal Reserve Bank was created as a lender of last resort, considerably
prior to the Great Depression. It was only when the lender of last resort
was accompanied by deposit insurance and tightened supervision that cri-
ses were prevented ~and one without the other can actually make a crisis
more likely, as the S&L debacle so clearly demonstrated!. But in the in-
ternational context, proposals for a lender of last resort are seldom ac-
companied by something that would pass as an analogue to deposit
insurance, with a tax imposed on lenders to support the “bailout” fund.
• There are, moreover, questions concerning whether a lender of last re-
sort is “necessary,” if governments really permit f lexible ~market-
determined! exchange rates and adopt adequate bankruptcy laws. Mutual
funds do not need a lender of last resort simply because they do not
have a “first-come, first-serve” repayment at “fixed rates.” Countries
are, in this sense, much more like mutual funds than they are like
banks, assuming f lexible exchange rates. The funds are needed to sup-
port the exchange rate—to give those few extremely wealthy individu-
als in Russia, for instance, time to take out their money at the high
exchange rate. When one recognizes that billions and billions have been
misspent by countries in the vain attempt to support their exchange
rate—dollars that in the end come out of the pockets of the countries’
taxpayers—the small sums lost in Harberger triangles and other forms
of microinefficiencies ~so often railed against! pale in comparison.
• The essential ingredient of a “lender of last resort” is that there should
be a degree of automaticity in access to funds to countries that “qualify.”
But in our rapidly changing world, can that be assured? A government
can gamble and lose its entire reserves overnight with derivatives. Should
such a government be entitled to a bailout, simply because it had pre-
viously acted in prudential ways? In the end, judgment calls will be
necessary. And how different will those judgment calls be from those
currently being made?
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• Moreover, the signal that a country does not qualify, or has changed
from “qualified” to “nonqualified” status could itself set off a crisis. Con-
cern about this has led to a shift from dichotomous policies to more
continuous ones: Countries that are “more qualified” get access to funds
“more easily” or on better terms. Can such a system be run in a trans-
parent way? The less transparent, the less “rule bound,” the less “au-
tomaticity” this system has, the less will the lender of last resort function
be served. Remember, the principle behind the lender of last resort is
that the knowledge that there is a large stock of funds available to
support a currency deters an attack. But the greater the discretion, the
less assurance there is that there is a large stock of funds available, and
hence the greater the incentive for an attack.
• Moreover, we now recognize the central role capital f light plays in cur-
rency crises. Given the huge amounts that could leave a country under
an open regime, there is a real question of whether any fund that is
likely to be amassed will provide sufficient assurance to reduce sub-
stantially the likelihood of an attack.
• I noted earlier that central to the success of a lender of last resort is
good supervision. Earlier, I detailed the problems LDCs face in bank
supervision. How supervision is run is not, however, just a technical
matter, which is why governments such as the United States have
insisted that, while supervision should remain “independent,” it also
remain politically accountable. The U.S. Comptroller of the Currency
reports directly to the Secretary of the Treasury. Historically, the United
States and other countries that have managed their way through cy-
clical f luctuations well have engaged in a certain degree of forbear-
ance, compensating for the forbearance in capital adequacy standards
with tightened supervision of transactions. I doubt that the United
States would be willing to delegate supervisory responsibility to a group
of international bureaucrats, only remotely politically accountable. Will
other countries be willing to do so? Perhaps, if in doing so they can
purchase greater credibility for their banking systems and greater “au-
tomaticity” of funds in the event of a crisis. But the answer is by no
means obvious. Note that financial crises are only one of many stim-
ulants for a currency crisis ~and hence the “need” for a bailout!. How
broad will the reach of supervision need to be? It takes an enormous
amount of confidence in international institutions to cede the kind of
authority that is required for a lender of last resort to work effec-
tively. It is not clear that we are at that stage yet in the evolution of
global economic governance.
10. Most importantly, there needs to be a congruence between a coun-
try’s exposure to risks, its ability to reduce (or its tendency to exacer-
bate) those risks, and the provisions it has made to insulate the most
vulnerable from the consequences of those risks (including its safety
nets).
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Earlier, I described small, less-developed countries in the international cap-
ital markets as small boats in a wild and rough sea: Even if well steered and
strongly constructed, they are likely to be capsized by a sufficiently large wave.
To be sure, if they are not well steered, and if there are holes in the boat, their
survival is even more precarious. This metaphor suggests that strong precau-
tions should be taken before going out to sea. Precisely the opposite has oc-
curred. The boat has been redesigned to make it sleeker and faster ~assuming
it could survive!!, which renders it more unstable, reducing survival chances
further still. Worse still, it has been set out to sail in the roughest part of the
sea, in the worst conditions, before safety vests have been put on board, and
before the skipper has had a chance to be trained for the new design. The con-
sequences have been all too predictable—and at great human costs.
Before concluding, I want to spend a minute on three methodological
“lessons.”
A. It is imperative that policymakers better integrate financial and
real economics. As has been noted repeatedly, at the heart of the East Asia
crisis were private capital f lows and a worry about bankruptcy and default.
If there were not such worries, Western banks would have been more than
willing to roll over their loans, especially at the high interest rates being
offered. Thus, not only is bankruptcy of a first-order importance, but poli-
cymakers need to focus on how policies being pursued affect the likelihood of
bankruptcy—it is a key endogenous variable. What is remarkable is that
more than 25 years after micromodels began emphasizing the key role that
bankruptcy plays in modern capitalism ~see, e.g., Stiglitz ~1969, 1972b! and
Greenwald and Stiglitz ~1992!!, more than 20 years after the link between
interest rates and bankruptcy was clearly articulated ~Stiglitz and Weiss
~1981!!, and 15 years after these ideas were embedded in macromodels ~Green-
wald and Stiglitz ~1984, 1993! and Stiglitz and Weiss ~1992!!, standard macro-
textbooks often do not even mention bankruptcy in the index.
Too often, the financial sector is summarized in a money demand equa-
tion. Doing so not only misses the complexity of the financial sector, but can
also lead to misguided policies. Indeed, the standard reduced-form relation-
ships between money and aggregate output, summarized in the LM curve,
all too often are markedly altered in the event of a financial or currency
crisis, even of the mild variety experienced in the U.S. S&L debacle.13 If this
is true for a relatively mild crisis, affecting a small fraction of the financial
sector, how much more so is it likely to be the case for the kind of major
upheaval experienced, for instance, by Indonesia?
B. One should be wary of anthropomorphizing the market and of
the prognostications of armchair market psychologists. The market
consists of many players, with different portfolios, risk preferences, and in-
13 This is now recognized to be an important contributor to the Fed’s failure to take appro-
priate actions to stave off the 1991 recession. See Stiglitz ~1992!.
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formation. There is enormous heterogeneity of beliefs, so much so that a
piece of information may at the same time make investments in a country
more attractive to some and less attractive to others. In particular, economic
downturns, while reassuring to foreign investors ~though even this is ques-
tionable!, would normally be expected to generate domestic capital outf lows.
Increased risk induces domestic residents to diversify. Although they cannot
easily diversify their human capital, they can move out more of their phys-
ical wealth. Time after time, we have seen domestic capital f light as an
important contributor to a crisis and its perpetuation.
One should be suspicious of anyone who says, “The market expects. . . .” I
have never met “Mr. Market,” and, as a former market participant, I can
only say that frequently my expectations differ from those of the armchair
market psychologists. Good analyses must take into account the diversity
that makes a market, paying due attention to the differences between those
in the country and those outside it.
C. We need to reach beyond anecdotes to construct coherent theo-
retical models and undertake empirical testing. Anecdotes are useful,
both as teaching tools and in helping to guide our thinking. Journalists, who
have to explain the world in simple terms, can be forgiven for relying on
anecdotes in interpreting events. But economists and social scientists more gen-
erally should be held to a higher standard. Do higher interest rates lead to a
stronger currency? Theoretical models can offer insights into the circum-
stances in which this might or might not be the case, and empirical work can
cast light on whether these predictions are borne out in practice. The evidence
is far from overwhelming in support of the “conventional wisdom” that higher
interest rates are necessary, if not sufficient, for maintaining the strength of
the currency.14 The theoretical prediction that higher interest rates may so
weaken an economy and increase the probability of bankruptcy that rather than
attracting capital ~net! they may induce capital to leave, seems to have been
borne out in the data—and evidenced in the East Asia crisis.
Not only do anecdotes seldom support only one side—adherents of contrary
positions can each proffer anecdotes in support of their opinions—but their in-
terpretation is often elusive. In the East Asian context, the Mexican experi-
ence is often cited: it “stayed the course” and quickly recovered. But Mexico
was smart; it chose as its neighbor and major trading partner a country with
a booming economy and a strong financial system, with whom a major trade
and investment treaty had just been signed. The countries of East Asia did not
show as much wisdom, choosing as their trading partner a country going into
its most severe recession in half a century and with a fragile financial system.
To what extent should we credit “staying the course” and resolute action for
the recovery? And to what extent should we credit “choosing one’s neighbor”?
My interpretation places a far greater weight on the latter; evidence for this
can be gleaned by looking at the source of recovery—exports to U.S. firms. In-
14 See Kraay ~1998! and Furman and Stiglitz ~1999!.
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deed, four years after the crisis, the domestic sector remains in weak shape.
Considering one of the often reiterated lectures to the East Asian countries re-
inforces the point: Recovery will require addressing the weaknesses in the fi-
nancial system. By contrast, there are repeated newspaper reports documenting
the continuing deep weaknesses in the Mexican financial system, with non-
performing loans—four years after the crisis—still exceeding those in several
of the East Asian crisis countries.
Every cloud has a silver lining, however thin: The disaster in East Asia, like
the Great Depression, will prove a rich source of Ph.D. theses for decades to
come. By examining such “extreme” events, we gather insights into the work-
ings of the economy in more normal times. The story of East Asia ~and the sub-
sequent crises of 1998! is far from over, and it would be premature to reach
any final verdicts. I suspect, however, that there will be a growing consensus
in support of the basic lessons that I have outlined in this talk.
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